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1.2 Les territoires dans les représentations d'acteurs

Territory and Governance: the Arab Republic of Egypt between Two Historical Political Actors

Territory and Governance: the Arab Republic of Egypt between two historical political actors
Sarah Tonsy
p. 127-137

Résumés

Après le soulèvement de 2011 en Égypte, les problèmes liés à la centralisation de l’État égyptien à sa gouvernance ont été révélés par le regain de rivalité entre l’armée égyptienne et les Frères musulmans (FM). Les promesses de décentralisation du président Abdel Fatah El-Sissi depuis 2014 ne sont pas encore à l’agenda politique du gouvernement. Cet article vise à analyser les effets de la centralisation de l’État égyptien sur l’armée égyptienne et les FM – deux acteurs historiques majeurs de la vie politique du pays depuis près d’un siècle. De façon réciproque, il questionne l’emprise territoriale de chacun d’eux, comme facteur susceptible de rendre compte de leur rivalité politique.

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Texte intégral

  • 1 . Decentralization is used here to mean the delegation of political power and institutional duties (...)
  • 2 . The MB have had internal problems since Mohamed Badi’s arrival as Supreme Guide or murshid, accor (...)

1More than five years after the 2011 uprising in Egypt, changes in governance and state centralization remain a pressing issue. The close link between political and administrative centralization in the country became more visible after 2011, demonstrated by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the Egyptian army’s political rivalry. Beside the increased economic influence of the security apparatus, governance has been left unchanged and promises of decentralization of the state apparatus are often repeated without action.1 The MB – which has historically overshadowed the Egyptian army’s presence in politics – seems to have been unable to regain its strength after the 2013 coup d’état and the following events.2 This article analyzes the impact of government centralization in Egypt and its effects on two of its most historically important political actors, the Egyptian army and MB. The analysis begins by questioning the influence of the state’s centralization and policies on both political actors and the impact of these actors on the political life of the country. The article goes on to examine the territorial coverage of both actors as relevant to their relationship with each other and the state.

2The topic of centralization and attempted decentralization in Egypt was one of the key points in current President Abdel Fatah el-Sissi’s 2014 campaign. In 2011, former Prime Minister (PM) Essam Sharaf, who presided during the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ (SCAF) rule, cancelled the 2008 decision for the formation of the Helwan and 6th of October governorates. The current president put forward a plan to change the surface area occupied by several governorates and to create three new governorates, increasing the national total to 30. The development and mobilization of these changes in 2014 – a period still marked by contention within the country–are important in understanding the problems and prospects of Egypt’s territorial decisions related to political centralization and decentralization.

  • 3 . The term people in this paper is meant to identify the politicized segment of the population; thu (...)

3The personnel of the army occupied political positions during different periods of time in the country, leading to this a state security apparatus becoming a de facto political actor in the Egyptian political field. In contrast, the MB is one of the oldest non-state political actors/ organizations in Egypt today. Beginning in 2011, the renewal of the presence of both political actors in the Egyptian political field is pertinent to understanding the reality of political dynamics within the country. The army and MB have both created their own stories surrounding the different events that have taken place since 2011. Each political actor used the events to increase their own symbolic power and domination. Analyzing the relationship of the army and MB in terms of their relationship with the “people” and Egypt as a territory is vital to understanding their impact on governance and national territorial cohesion.3 In order to carry out this analysis, a series of questions must be answered: What is the historical connection between each political actor and the Egyptian territory? How do the centralization and/or decentralization of the army and MB as political actors translate territorially? How does the politically centralized system of Egypt contribute to this distribution? How does this affect the unity of the national territory?

  • 4 . Bayart’s term literally refers to an added or transplanted part of the state.
  • 5 . Egypt’s ground army is the one that carries out most politically affiliated activities and whose (...)

4In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising, other political actors, parties, and movements did not experience the same magnitude of renewal, which makes them outside the scope of the research questions addressed in this paper. The army and MB are two political actors that can be described by Jean Francois Bayart’s term “la greffe de l’état” due to their political activity during the period of transition from monarchy to republic (Bayart 2008).4 This paper reflects upon the symbolically relevant points for the army and MB as political actors and how their struggle for political power has affected their centralization or decentralization – geographically – within the Egyptian territory. By mobilizing the hypothesis that the centralized Egyptian state system (al-dawla al-markazeyah) and political field contributed to a centralization of the approaches of these political actors, this paper posits this explanation for why attempts of decentralization by political actors, most prominently the MB (among others), remain unsuccessful. In this paper, the army is treated as a political actor (and organization), which mostly concerns the ground army.5 Nazih Ayubi refers to the increase of military personnel and expenditure as the “growth of body and muscle” of Arab states resulting in the increased political role of the military establishment in many Arab states (Ayubi 1995).

  • 6 . The term agent is used as in Bourdieu’s concept in his explanation of symbolic power and the agen (...)

5The structure of this paper is as follows: first, I describe the connection between each political actor and Egypt’s independence. Second, I outline the similarities and differences of the distribution of the army and MB in Egypt and reflect upon the reasons for this modality.6 Last, I provide a summary of how struggles between these two political actors is embedded within the socio-political history of Egypt and how this has affected (and is affected by) governance and attempts for decentralization.

Independence of Egypt and Key Political Actors7

  • 7 . A map of Egypt’s 27 governorates is included in the appendix for reference – without the amendmen (...)
  • 8 . In the media 1952 is referred to as a revolution, there is also the “Dictionary of the Egyptian R (...)
  • 9 . Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power refers to power that is derived from outside of the p (...)
  • 10 . Khaled Muhi el-Din’ is one of the Free Officers (FO), known for his Marxist tendency and a close (...)

6The 1920s saw a rise in the anti-occupation and nationalist movements in Egypt. The army and MB both claim themselves as symbols and actors for Egypt’s liberation from British occupation, a process that took place over decades and cannot be reduced to the 23rd of July 1952 coup d’état or revolution – as referred to officially (ʻAtị̄yat Allāh 1954).8 Until today, the discourse of the “liberating army of the people” on one hand and the feda’eyoun (consisting mostly of army officers and MB members) on the other remains a symbolic power struggle between the MB and army.9 The MB fought against the British in Ismailia, Port Said and Suez since the movement’s formation. Meanwhile, the army originally created by Muhammad Ali followed the regime until a political opportunity presented itself like in 1952 or 2011. Khalid Muhi El-Din explains that the Free Officers’ (al-thobat al-ahrar, FO) movement within the army was created in the 1940s.10 Therefore, both political actors claim themselves as agents that brought about the independence of Egypt and the formation of the first Republic.

  • 11 . Hannah Arendt in On Revolution explains the symbolic power given to an actor that carried out a r (...)

7The narration here, of the passage from a Monarchy to the Arab Republic of Egypt, matters for the political and symbolic power of political actors within their respective organizations and also to the people outside these groups. The fact that 1952 is labeled thawra (revolution), when according to Anouar Abdel-Malek and other scholars it was not, continues to give a certain power to the actors involved (Arendt 1965).11 The 1952 coup d’état is especially important, as it was the only event clearly labeled in the media (and school textbooks) as a revolution until 2011. Since the 1950’s repression, the army ignored the role of the MB in the passage from monarchy to republic. However, the MB’s own discourse glorifies its role in the independence of Egypt and in leading opposition throughout the years, from British occupation until 2012.

  • 12 . This slogan was among the army’s slogans in the 1950’s as the modernizer and agent of developing (...)

8One of the most prominent army slogans is “one hand builds and the other carries arms.”12 This connects the army, as a political actor, to the Arab Republic of Egypt on a level that is absent from MB discourse (Richards and Waterbury 1991). The image of the army, which builds, manufactures and modernizes, links it to the vision of a modern and industrialized Egypt. Different sections attached to the army were formed to lead new industries and projects in the 1950s and 60s, which can be interpreted as a form of centralization of the political economy (Richards and Waterbury 1991). The army officers were “among the relatively more educated, organized and technologically oriented sectors of the society” (Ayubi 1991).

9Furthermore, there is the connection between the army and MB on the one hand, and with these actors with the people (asha’ab) on the other. Abdel Halim Hafez, Nasser’s designated singer, sang “besm esha’ab” (in the name of the people) on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the 1952 revolution; the same line that opened several of Nasser’s speeches. The reassertion of the people as connected to the army in slogans, songs and general discourse was characteristic of the time as much as it was in 2011 and has been since June 2013. The “army of the people” (geish esha’ab) was the primary discourse around which the army was founded, and it was among the lines used by General Ahmed ‘Urabi in 1881, just before the British occupation (Mayer 1988).

10At the same time, the MB sees itself as the most active, organized and oldest social movement in the country; within its internal discourse, members claim a special connection with the people. The use of religion as a political tool gives the MB a common language, when addressing society as a whole, under the umbrella of the al-da’wa (religious call) of the people. However, the main goal behind their use of religion is the development of an internal discourse that supports the group’s political aspirations, as noted by scholars such as Brynjar Lia and Tariq al-Bishri (al-Bishri 2002 and Lia 2015). The framework of Gramsci’s notion of common sense is very relevant here, because of the availability of religion and its convenience to organizations like the MB who use it as a ready-made common sense (Gramsci 1988).

11Nevertheless, in relation to the 2011 uprising, it is questionable whether the army or MB had a special connection with the people as claimed. A detachment from the people grew more evident as events continued to unravel following 2011. As political – and economic – elite both the army and MB positioned themselves as superior to the people. This is evident in many recent and historical examples of confrontation between these political actors and the people as a politicized mass.

Anatomy of a Political Territorial Distribution

12The MB and the army have had a rocky relationship since 2011 due to the political rivalry that began between them as contingent political actors. Partisans of both actors repeated symbols, slogans and discourse that deepened the wound in this political relationship and increased the power struggle. This section is an attempt to briefly revisit the relationship between the army and MB during the 20th century while reflecting upon this relationship’s effect on their territorial distribution. Using a bottom-up approach to the analysis of the inherit centralization of these political actors, the findings are reminiscent of the transition from colonialism to independence.

  • 13 . This was highlighted in the first part of this paper. Some members moved to governorates of Upper (...)

13The centralization and decentralization debate is crucial to understanding the post-2011 situation in Egypt in general as well as its specific aspects – ranging from socio-political relations in the political field to the state of political economy. The army and MB’s relationship affected their structures, recruitment of candidates and territorial distribution. The repression of the MB beginning in the late 1950s motivated their dispersal around Egypt and into neighboring Arab countries.13 This section describes the centralization and/or decentralization of both organizations.

The MB: decentralized or centralized?

  • 14 . Hisham is a prominent ex-member of the MB and its Guidance Bureau, interviewed by the author, Jun (...)

14During an interview in 2015 with Hisham, he declared, “don’t forget that Abdel-Nasser [Nasser] was a member of the ikhwan [MB] in the late 1940s until before the thawra of 1952.”14 This statement summed up a general view on the relationship between the army and MB during the period from the 1940s until the 1980s, which affected the MB’s territorial distribution. However, Nasser never declared himself as a MB member and neither did the FO. Scholars like Tewfik Aclimandos, al-Bishri and Lia highlight the presence of FOs with MB affiliations (Aclimandos 2008, 2010, Lia 2015 and al-Bishri 2002). Army-MB relations also affected Nasser’s rural politics beginning in the mid 1950s as argued by James Mayfield (Mayfield 1971). Mayfield highlights the reason behind Nasser’s enforcement of the party and village councils as a desire to neutralize the dominance of other political forces (Mayfield 1971). Therefore, Hisham’s declaration superposes the topic of this research directly on the map of this turbulent relationship between two of the longest surviving political actors in Egypt – the army and MB.

  • 15 . Hisham, June 2015, Cairo.
  • 16 . Interview with ex-MB member, Samer, currently in exile, Novemeber-December 2011.

15The MB as an organization is allegedly decentralized in its social and political composition, due to the decentralized nature of its lower rank members leading up to the Supreme Guide (or murshid). The organization is divided into governorates; each governorate has its own head. Within the governorates, there are districts and what is referred to internally as families or osra. While the internal hierarchy is socially decentralized, decision-making remains within in the closed circle of the Guidance Bureau (or maktab al-irshad), with members originally from different governorates but mainly residing in Cairo. This Bureau consists of about 15 members, mostly members from the armed wing of the MB, al-tanzim al-khass, since Mohamed Badi’s became murshid in 2010.15 In his book on the subject, Al-Bishri describes how Hassan el-Banna, the founder of the MB, kept decision making power largely to himself, including decisions that had to do with the political integration of the MB at the time (al-Bishri 2002). The organization does not engage in delegation of decision-making when it comes to political mobilization either, which was evident during the uprisings that have occurred since 2011. The Guidance Bureau refused to give official orders for MB members to participate in demonstrations.16 Thus, it can be argued that the MB is a centralized organization with a decentralized outreach on the Egyptian territories.

16The outlined structure of the MB should not be taken for granted when examining its effects on the diffusion of its historical, political and socio-religious discourse. Al-Bishri describes the MB’s use of religion as an attempt to monopolize religion in the social and political spheres (al-Bishri 2002), which could be analytically traced back to the lack of connection and shared common sense with people outside of religious discourse. The MB has historical lineage in each governorate, and stories about the first members in each governorate and their connections with the founder el-Banna remain important (al-Bishri 2002). However, these links are also the outcome of repression by the army during the late 1950s up until the 1970s. With the lack of infrastructure during this period –still largely the case outside of the key governorates – Aswan was considered an exile. The MB, unlike the army, had the ability to be physically and socially present in all governorates. The MB’s presence near the borders with the Palestinian territories, Sinai, and the surrounding areas during the years following the Camp David accord, served to enforce the Sadat-Mubarak regimes and the MB’s political power.

17Another aspect that supports the MB’s territorial distribution and centralized internal governance is their interpretation and use of the concept of obedience (or ‘ta’a). This concept is the backbone of the organization’s hierarchical structure and is diffused from the lower, student ranks to the highest. The MB leaders claim that obedience of the members is a “must” in order to maintain unity. This explains how MB leaders and members are mobilized or demobilized according to the Bureau’s orders including those in Greater Cairo, in other governorates, or those coming to demonstrate in Greater Cairo. While this instills rigid internal boundaries between leaders and members, it also gives flexibility for the MB Bureau (or the internal leaders) and its presence as a political actor. The MB was able to officially decide not to participate in the general strike of 2008 or 2011, and did not mobilize its members. But at the same time it used its autonomous members’ participation to demonstrate its strength from the beginning and enforce its recurrent rhetoric of clandestine presence (Vannetzel 2016).

  • 17 . This was discussed in an interview by an ex-MB member among which their were details that prove t (...)

18During Mubarak’s decades in power, the MB was co-opted in local and rural areas in order to guarantee that other political discourses and currents were left without popular ties (Menza 2012). The financial aspect of the MB structure also reflects its level of centralization. Each MB member donates five percent of his salary to the organization. This is not considered a religious donation like the zakat (alms giving), but it fulfills one of the requirements to become an official member of the MB. This money is collected by leaders in every governorate and is not monitored by the state, nor shared internally with members in the budget of the organization. This gives a sense of attachment by the lower rank members, while enhancing the MB’s centralized institutional structure.17

The Army and its Centralization

19The army today follows the same organizational structure as determined by Nasser in 1967, with the exception of el-Sissi’s recent addition of the Quick Intervention Forces in 2014. The army, however, remains a distant political actor compared to the MB. The army is socially feared and shut off from the public. The famous motto “the army is for the army” remains salient.

20Conscriptions to the army are not divided by governorate, so the army does not have a physical manifestation or representative in each of the 27 governorates ( in the process of becoming 30 governorates in 2014). Therefore, the army is not visible across the territory, nor in all governorates. Conscripts are referred to collective offices that gather candidates from several governorates at a time. The army’s presence is heavier in certain governorates like Cairo, Alexandria, Ismailia, Suez and Port Said, among which the first, second and third Field Armies are divided.

  • 18 . This was not the only gain for the army. The army members’ salaries about doubled since 2011 acco (...)
  • 19 . Alexandrani, conference October 2015, Paris.
  • 20 . Ibid.

21As mentioned when examining the case of the MB, the army was not previously allowed to be present in Sinai or on the borders with the Palestinian territories, which was one of the key gains of the army in 2011.18 This can explain the rise of armed militant groups like those in Sinai Province,19 after the army’s appearance in the area in 2011. Historically Sinai belonged socially to the Islamists, politically to the MB, and to the Bedouins in terms of armed presence.20

22The army as a political actor is highly centralized in the governorates mentioned above. In governorates where the MB has a strong presence, a governor with a military background is usually appointed (Springborg 1989). The physical presence of the army today in some areas like Sinai changed the status of the army in the area as a political actor and security apparatus.

The Current State of Centralization

  • 21 . This could be seen on maps showing population density in Egypt.

23Centralization (al-markazeya) and decentralization (al-lamarkazeya) has become at the forefront of Egyptian political debate. The current state of centralization is the result of more than a century of increasing centralization – some scholars even trace this phenomenon back to the Pharaohs and centralization of life in proximity to the Nile Valley.21 The authoritarian regimes of leading political forces and monopoly of state bureaucracy, economy and civil society were met with attempts at territorial distribution, but resulted in further centralization of wealth and decision-making in the 20th century (Richards and Waterbury 1991). These political forces mainly include the army, MB, and the National Democratic Party (NDP), along with Sadat and Mubarak’s political and economic entourage. The use of the MB by the Sadat-Mubarak regimes for further territorial reach is one of the reasons that the MB is of interest as a political actor. Sadat and Mubarak put the MB on Egypt’s map, literally and politically.

  • 22 . She stated that in reference to how the MB took over power following the SCAF’s rule in 2011.
  • 23 . In May 2011 in a conference at Cairo University in collaboration with the Kroc Institute for Inte (...)

24The relationship between the army and MB since the early 20th century added to the territorial, bureaucratic and institutional depth of the struggle over Egypt’s governance that began in 2011. As Maha AbdelRahman stated, “activists who had bravely challenged an increasingly repressive regime for the years leading up to the 25 January uprising . . . found themselves on the margins of this power struggle” (Abdel Rahman 2013).22Journalists and scholars examining events in different governorates highlight the effects of the centralization of political actors on the territorial and social cohesion for Egyptians through their interventions.23

  • 24 . In Mayfield’s book, one of the interviewed rural directors said that youth were only interested i (...)
  • 25 . Mohamed, interviewed by the author, June 2015, ex-MB youth member.

25A first example is the concentration of the media solely on certain governorates, which affects the discourse of the key political actors today. There are often protests that take place in some governorates that are only shared through social media and/or through personal accounts. Researchers highlight that in 2011 many people came from other governorates to protest in masr, meaning Egypt in Arabic, and used to refer to Greater Cairo at large as well demonstrations at Tahrir Square. A similar centralization can be seen in the demonstrations that followed in 2012 until 2014. In the MB’s sit-in in Rab’a Square, members from around the country came to engage in the sit-in in Cairo. There is a perception that, if it is not happening in masr, it is not taking place.24 This is also relevant when ignoring the protests that take place today in the governorates away from the security apparatuses’ reach.25

26A second outcome of centralization is the continued effects on the court systems and judicial structure in Egypt. Nathan Brown explains the centralization of the court structure in his book, which he notes to have increased during the period from 1937-71 under Nasser’s governance (Brown 1997). This is not to say that there have been no changes on the court and judicial system since then but rather to highlight the dependence on a Cairo-based bureaucracy that paralyzes any attempts at decentralization.

27Last, but not least, is the unimportance given to the people in general as political actors in their different roles and respective communities. The strikes by the textile and weaving workers in Helwan, part of Greater Cairo – which also includes Giza – can be cited as a key example (Beinin 2014). The strikes started much earlier than 2011 – 2008 witnessed the most increase in strikes – but were left isolated until 2011. Similarly, the voices of organizations like the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) remain unheard despite their continuous struggle to gain political significance and empowerment (Beinin 2014 and Regeni 2016). Further, the recent upheaval in Aswan (and surrounding Nubian villages) provides another example of a community deprived of an arena to voice their demands for keeping their land and language in the face of the new government’s reforms. This can also be said to be true for the sectarian crisis that has been taking place in Upper and Lower Egyptian governorates for decades, which sometimes manifests itself in Greater Cairo; but remains neglected by the government and judicial system.

Conclusion

28The centralization of the Egyptian political system, actors, and state system is the main topic explored throughout this paper. The connection that exists between the political actors and the people is always put to the test when it is in key governorates and Greater Cairo. Egypt as a territory is yet to be consolidated in terms of effective governance and being encompassed by the state apparatus. Many places remain out of reach for the state, the coercive apparatus, and state bureaucracy, which further validates the centralization of most political actors and their main spheres of influence. The centralization of the army and MB is both a reason and consequence of the centralized state and political field in Egypt. The centralized governance and political-economic strategies from Nasser until Mubarak resulted in dependency on non-state actors for the fulfillment of many of the government’s tasks, ranging from health care to education.

29El-Sissi’s plan for decentralization confirms that political actors identify with the problems that have developed because of increased state centralization and influence of political actors. The key conclusions here begin with the inability of the army and MB to generate involvement from the people and have representation throughout the territory. The army’s superiority to the people in its discourse and actions remains an obstacle to its involvement in the political field. The army is a state apparatus that requires centralized decision-making and makes a civilianization of the army in power a step towards decentralization.

30On the other hand, the MB, as a political actor in opposition, does not gain much power or representation of the people’s interests in various contexts through its territorial dispersal. Delegation of power to local MB representatives was not part of the MB’s internal discourse or hierarchy. Still, the MB’s status today as a terrorist group and its removal from the political field, allows room for other movements and opposition groups to provide a local alternative.

31The effects of the long centralization processes in Egypt led to the centralization of different aspects of the people’s everyday lives. This includes the media, infrastructure, administrative procedures, economic opportunities, judicial system, etc . Egypt’s territorial cohesion rests on the shoulders of the current hegemonic political actors and that of the opposition to include the voices of locals from Sinai to Nubia. This is possible maintaining that policies move towards the creation of state representative bodies and delegation of governance to these local state representatives.

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Notes

1 . Decentralization is used here to mean the delegation of political power and institutional duties – and hence law enforcement and liability. Centralization refers to the opposite, which is the concentration of political power and institutional duties in the hands of the central state apparatus – and its personnel – without putting the local governors to further institutional use.

2 . The MB have had internal problems since Mohamed Badi’s arrival as Supreme Guide or murshid, according to Hisham, a prominent ex-member of the MB and its Guidance Bureau, interviewed by the author in June 2015, Cairo. The media has highlighted the ruptures within the organization since 2013.

3 . The term people in this paper is meant to identify the politicized segment of the population; thus, referring to the people as a political presence.

4 . Bayart’s term literally refers to an added or transplanted part of the state.

5 . Egypt’s ground army is the one that carries out most politically affiliated activities and whose participants have most presence in the Egyptian political field. This is not only for the Egyptian case; but coup plotters are mostly ground armies with few members from the other sections.

6 . The term agent is used as in Bourdieu’s concept in his explanation of symbolic power and the agents who are qualified to speak for the political organization.

7 . A map of Egypt’s 27 governorates is included in the appendix for reference – without the amendments that are still not effective declared by current president Abdel-Fatah el-Sissi in 2014, which would form 30 governorates in total.

8 . In the media 1952 is referred to as a revolution, there is also the “Dictionary of the Egyptian Revolution.”

9 . Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power refers to power that is derived from outside of the political field (Bourdieu and Thompson 1991). It is used here to outline the link between the MB and army’s symbolic power, and their influence territorially and in terms of governance.

10 . Khaled Muhi el-Din’ is one of the Free Officers (FO), known for his Marxist tendency and a close acquaintance to Nasser.

11 . Hannah Arendt in On Revolution explains the symbolic power given to an actor that carried out a revolution, which is mostly the reason why the term is used.

12 . This slogan was among the army’s slogans in the 1950’s as the modernizer and agent of developing Egypt and was rediffused after 2011.

13 . This was highlighted in the first part of this paper. Some members moved to governorates of Upper Egypt to stay away from the eyes of the authorities.

14 . Hisham is a prominent ex-member of the MB and its Guidance Bureau, interviewed by the author, June 2015, Cairo. Hisham, June 2015, Cairo.

15 . Hisham, June 2015, Cairo.

16 . Interview with ex-MB member, Samer, currently in exile, Novemeber-December 2011.

17 . This was discussed in an interview by an ex-MB member among which their were details that prove the organization’s involvement in the details of the lives of their members; but are not relevant to this paper.

18 . This was not the only gain for the army. The army members’ salaries about doubled since 2011 according to a trusted source.

19 . Alexandrani, conference October 2015, Paris.

20 . Ibid.

21 . This could be seen on maps showing population density in Egypt.

22 . She stated that in reference to how the MB took over power following the SCAF’s rule in 2011.

23 . In May 2011 in a conference at Cairo University in collaboration with the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies.

24 . In Mayfield’s book, one of the interviewed rural directors said that youth were only interested in moving out of the village and getting hired somewhere in Cairo and Alexandria.

25 . Mohamed, interviewed by the author, June 2015, ex-MB youth member.

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Pour citer cet article

Référence papier

Sarah Tonsy, « Territory and Governance: the Arab Republic of Egypt between Two Historical Political Actors  », L’Année du Maghreb, 16 | 2017, 127-137.

Référence électronique

Sarah Tonsy, « Territory and Governance: the Arab Republic of Egypt between Two Historical Political Actors  », L’Année du Maghreb [En ligne], 16 | 2017, mis en ligne le 10 juillet 2017, consulté le 22 juillet 2017. URL : http://anneemaghreb.revues.org/3001 ; DOI : 10.4000/anneemaghreb.3001

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Auteur

Sarah Tonsy

PhD candidate at the Institut d’Études Politiques, Aix en Provence, CHERPA.

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